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ESTs under Canadian Patent Law: Useful or Not?
Natalie C. Bellefeuille†

Introduction

one of the two cDNA strands: a 5’ EST is obtained when
the beginning portion of a cDNA is sequenced, whereas
a 3’ EST is obtained when the ending portion of a cDNA
is sequenced. 9 ESTs thus represent short DNA sequences,
the majority of which encode part of a gene, but rarely a
full-length gene. As will be discussed in greater detail
below, they are generally only useful to researchers as
tools to identify the full-length gene, and rarely provide
information about the function or location of the gene.

The Debate
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T

he patentability of human genetic material has
given rise to considerable debate around the
world. 1 As Kevles notes, ‘‘[o]ne of the most controversial
issues in biotechnology in the Unites States and Europe
has been the patenting of human DNA sequences and
human genes’’. 2 A number of academics and organizations have written on the issue, and arguments both for
and against have covered a broad range of concerns of an
economic, social, medical, scientific and ethical nature.
Patents have been issued on human genetic material in most jurisdictions. 3 Applicants have sought protection for DNA fragments (nucleotide sequences that do
not encode full-length genes) including promoter
sequences, enhancer sequences, individual exons, complimentary DNA (cDNA), expressed sequences tags
(ESTs) and single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). 4
Patent protection has also been sought and granted for
full-length gene sequences, synthetic and mutant DNA
and gene sequences, amino acid sequences, cloning and
expression vectors, methods of transforming genes, and
recombinant DNA. 5 The majority of these patents have
been issued by American, European, and Japanese patent
offices. 6
The technical debate as to whether human genetic
material meets the requirements for patentability under
the law has mainly focused on DNA sequences that do
not encode full-length genes, such as ESTs.

Focus of this Article
A number of patent applications seeking protection
over DNA fragments, in particular ESTs, have been filed
with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO),
which is currently faced with the difficult task of determining whether such products are patentable subjectmatter and whether they satisfy the requirements under
the Patent Act. 10 Whatever CIPO ultimately decides, we
could expect litigation to arise, calling upon the courts to
clarify the issue. 11
In the United States, utility is the patentability
requirement that has received the most scholarly attention in the context of patenting of biotechnological
inventions, because of the debate surrounding the patentability of ESTs. 12 Both courts and the Patents and
Trademarks Office (USPTO) have struggled to address
criticisms both for and against their patentability. It is
still not clear exactly how the USPTO treats applications
for EST patents. 13
The following discussion will examine the utility
requirement for patentability in the context of EST patents. Part I will provide background information
regarding the utility requirement under patent law and
will explain why it has been difficult to apply to ESTs.
Part II will briefly examine how other jurisdictions, in
particular the United States, have addressed the difficulties associated with applying the current utility requirement to biological materials, in particular ESTs. Part III
will look at how Canadian courts have interpreted and
applied the utility requirement for patentability, and will
suggest that ESTs have sufficient value to the scientific
community to satisfy this requirement. In addition, it
will examine how the doctrine of sound prediction may

What are ESTs?
Double-stranded human DNA contains sequences
which code for genes. When genes are expressed, they
produce proteins. During a process called transcription,
the parts of DNA that encode genes are copied into
mRNA. The mRNA present in cells at any given time
presents a picture of which genes are being expressed. 7
Using an enzyme called reverse transcriptase, researchers
are able to produce a complimentary and more stable
copy of the mRNA called cDNA. 8 ESTs are produced by
sequencing a small number of nucleotides at the end of
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allow patent protection to be extended beyond the
simple EST nucleotide sequence. This article will conclude by suggesting two reasons why the utility criterion
for patentability has proven difficult to apply to human
genetic materials.
The patenting of human genetic materials,
including ESTs, raises a number of concerns apart from
the question of whether they meet the utility requirement under patent legislation. Not only are there legal
concerns in terms of whether such ‘‘inventions’’ are patentable subject-matter and whether they satisfy the
requirements of novelty and non-obviousness, but there
are also important moral concerns. 14 While all of these
issues are clearly related and not completely separable,
an examination of their intersection is beyond the scope
of this article.

Part I: Utility as a Patentability
Requirement
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The Utility Requirement

I

n Canada, an invention is defined as ‘‘any new and
useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement in
any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter’’. 15 To meet the utility requirement, an invention must do what the patent claims say it can do. 16
According to the CIPO Manual of Patent Office Practice
(MOPOP), the invention must be ‘‘operative, controllable
and reproducible’’. 17 Patent legislation in the United
States 18 and Australia 19 similarly require that an invention be ‘‘useful’’ to be patentable.
The European Patent Convention, at article 52, sets
out the requirements that must be met for a patent to be
issued: ‘‘Patents shall be granted for any inventions
which are susceptible of industrial application, which are
new and which involve an inventive step’’. 20 It further
states that ‘‘an invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in
any kind of industry, including agriculture’’. 21 Section
29(1) of the Japan Patent Law reads ‘‘any person who has
made an invention which is industrially applicable may
obtain a patent therefor. . ..’’. 22 ‘‘The word ‘industry’ is
interpreted in a broad sense, including mining, agriculture, fishery, transportation, telecommunications, etc., as
well as manufacturing’’. 23
According to the Nuffield Council on Bioethics
report entitled The Ethics of Patenting DNA, the expression ‘‘susceptible of industrial application’’ is broader
than the term ‘‘utility’’. 24 The report suggests that, in
practice because industrial applicability has been construed narrowly, the two standards are analogous. 25 This,
however, does not appear to be a unanimous position,
one source suggesting that, in fact, utility is broader than
industrial applicability. 26
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Difficulties in Applying the Utility
Requirement to ESTs
In most jurisdictions, patent legislation has not been
significantly amended to reflect advancements in biotechnology. As explained in the Government of Ontario
report, Genetics, Testing & Gene Patenting: Charting
New Territory in Healthcare, ‘‘the current patent system
in Canada [is] not. . .designed to address questions of
DNA patenting and the commercialization of the
human genome’’. 27 In the Harvard Mouse case, the
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the
Patent Act is ‘‘ill-equipped’’ to deal with the patenting of
higher life forms. 28
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights requires that ‘‘patent laws [be]
applied without discrimination on the basis of technology’’. 29 This has the status of an international norm. 30
Despite the fact that patent legislation is poorly designed
to address innovation in the field of biotechnology, such
inventions must be considered within the same patent
regime as all other inventions. 31 Courts and patent
offices around the world have therefore been faced with
the difficult task of interpreting their legislative provisions and developing interpretive guidelines to address
the issues raised by biotechnological inventions. 32
Because of exceptional advancements in DNA
sequencing techniques that have occurred over the last
10 years, ‘‘more DNA sequences have become available
without a concomitant understanding of their function’’. 33 DNA sequences that arise from these methods
often represent short stretches of DNA, such as ESTs.
Most ESTs do not provide scientifically useful information regarding the identity or function of the full-length
gene. 34 Rather, ESTs are generally considered ‘‘weak and
nonspecific tools for further research’’ that are generally
only useful as probes or chromosomal markers. 35 A
probe is a ‘‘DNA sequence that is used to detect the
presence of a complementary sequence by hybridization
with a nucleic acid sample’’. 36 A chromosomal marker is
defined as ‘‘[a] distinct sequence found on a chromosome that helps identify a particular area of it’’. 37 While
ESTs can be used to isolate the full-length gene, which
can then be sequenced and characterized to identify its
function, it is the full-length gene which tends to be
viewed as the subject of interest and value, not the EST.
The application of the utility requirement to ESTs is
problematic because, as Lech explains, any DNA
sequence can be used to identify the chromosome from
which it originates or to locate the gene to which it
relates. 38 Similarly, all ESTs can be used as probes or
markers to locate the full-length gene, except perhaps for
those that are short and only encode a polyA or polyT
sequence (short sequence from the 3’ end of the EST). 39
Thus, use as probes and markers is not specific to ESTs,
but applies to almost any nucleotide sequence.

ESTs under Canadian Patent Law: Useful or Not?

Occasionally, a full-length gene will be encompassed within a single EST, or the DNA sequence of the
EST will reveal an important motif or domain, which
can allow the function of the gene and/or protein to be
predicted. 40 In addition, ESTs can have very specific uses.
As explained in the CBAC Report: ‘‘The utilities of
nucleotide sequences patented to date include their role
in gene regulation, encoding for therapeutic proteins,
diagnostic probes, receptors used for identifying molecular targets for therapeutic drug development, immunogens, and gene replacement therapies’’. 41 DNA
sequences with such functions usually satisfy the utility
requirement since they have a specific use apart from
that of the full-length gene.
This leads to the question of what type of utility is
necessary for ESTs to satisfy the requirement under
patent legislation. Is the scientific value of research tools
sufficient to meet the utility requirement under the law?

Part II: Response in Other Jurisdictions
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United States

M

ost of the debate regarding the patentability of
human genetic material, in particular ESTs, has
taken place in the United States. To understand how the
utility requirement applies to DNA patents, it is important to examine how the interpretation of the requirement has changed over time.

Prior to 1966, an invention was considered useful if
it was not ‘‘frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound morals of society’’. 42 The utility requirement was, at this time, described as a de minimis standard, as ‘‘it [was] seldom a bar to the issue of a given
patent. . .[and] all that [was] required [was] a showing that
the claimed invention [had] some practical, if attenuated,
application or use’’. 43
In the 1966 decision of Brenner v. Manson, the
United States Supreme Court replaced the de minimis
standard for utility with a more demanding requirement. 44 It found that, to be patentable, an invention had
to have ‘‘substantial utility. . .[providing a] specific benefit
in its currently available form’’. 45 The Court added that
an invention was not patentable if it was ‘‘only useful in
the sense that it may be an object of scientific
research’’. 46 It also noted that ‘‘a patent is not a hunting
license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its successful conclusion’’. 47
In the 1980 decision of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
the United States Supreme Court adopted a very broad
definition of what constitutes patentable subject-matter,
stating that ‘‘anything under the sun that is made by
man is eligible for patenting’’. 48 Not long after, the
USPTO started issuing patents on DNA sequences. 49
However, the utility requirement was not applied
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evenly. 50 In 1991, the National Institutes of Health filed
patent applications for approximately 2,700 partial DNA
sequences, seeking protection not only for the EST
sequences, but also for the full-length gene sequences
and the proteins derived from these genes. 51 On the
basis of Brenner v. Manson, the applications were denied
as the DNA sequences in question were considered mere
research tools that would not satisfy the utility requirement. 52
The USPTO, in 1995, issued examination guidelines which imposed a more generous standard for
assessing utility. These guidelines required ‘‘credible
utility’’, which could be satisfied if ‘‘the assertion of
utility was believable to a person of ordinary skill in the
art based on the totality of evidence and reasoning provided’’. 53 The guidelines were viewed as a return to the
de minimis standard. 54 They did not, however, resolve all
of the issues associated with EST patentability. 55
In 1997, the USPTO announced that from then on
it would be granting patents for ESTs, as their utility as
probes for locating the corresponding full-length gene
was sufficient to meet the requirement under the new
guidelines. 56 It did specify, however, that the patent
would not cover the full-length gene unless the EST
encompassed the entire gene sequence. 57 This decision
was highly controversial. Only two months later, the
USPTO revised its position, stating that ‘‘usefulness as a
probe alone [will] not qualify an EST as patentable. . .[The] inventor must have some knowledge of the
function or utility of the target gene for an EST as a
probe to satisfy the legal requirements for patenting’’. 58
Furthermore, ‘‘patent applicants must demonstrate a
more ‘substantial, real-world utility; not some throwaway
utility’’’. 59 Thus, a large number of ESTs would not meet
the requirement. 60 Based on the Eli Lilly decision of
1997, the USPTO ‘‘refused to grant claims on any nucleotide sequence other than those disclosed in the application even if the type of gene was identified’’. 61
In 2001, the USPTO issued revised utility guidelines, according to which an applicant must ‘‘assert a
specific and substantial utility that a person of ordinary
skill in the art to which the invention pertains would
consider credible’’. 62 A ‘‘specific’’ utility is one that is not
general in nature, but applies to the particular subjectmatter claimed, 63 whereas, a ‘‘substantial’’ utility requires
a real world use (an immediate benefit without the need
to conduct further research). 64 ‘‘Credible’’ requires that
the utility be ‘‘believable to a person of ordinary skill in
the art, based on the totality of evidence and reasoning
provided’’. 65 These guidelines have been incorporated
into the USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure. 66
This revised utility requirement represents a return
to the Brenner v. Manson standard. 67 A DNA sequence
that is useful only as a gene probe or chromosomal
marker, will not have a ‘‘specific’’ utility, unless, the par-
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ticular gene or chromosome target is also identified. 68 A
DNA fragment will have substantial utility where it
allows genes linked to a particular disease to be identified, but not where ‘‘it is only useful for studying its own
properties’’. 69 The use of ESTs as probes or markers will
always be credible, because nucleotide sequences are
routinely used for such purposes. 70
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Thus, in the United States, certain ESTs are patentable. 71 According to Demaine & Fellmeth, the USPTO
‘‘now routinely grants, and federal courts consistently
uphold, patents on newly discovered. . .DNA fragments’’. 72 While quite a few patents were issued for ESTs
belonging to certain gene families prior to the revised
utility guidelines, it is not clear how many have been
granted by the USPTO since the revised guidelines have
been in force. 73 According to Human Genome Project
Information online, the USPTO has issued only ‘‘a few
patents for gene fragments’’. 74
A recent Federal Circuit decision has upheld the
revised utility guidelines. In In re Fisher, the applicant
sought patent protection for 5 ESTs that encoded protein fragments in maize plants. 75 While the structure and
function of the full-length genes and proteins were
unknown, the applicant argued that this was irrelevant,
since the ESTs were useful as research tools, and these
uses were distinct from the function of the encoded gene
or protein. 76 The Court found that the ESTs did not
meet the requirement under the new utility guidelines.
They did not have specific utility, because the utility
claimed applied to a broad class of invention (all ESTs
and not the specific ESTs that the applicant
‘‘invented’’). 77 The ESTs did not have substantial utility,
as set out in Brenner v. Manson, because they did not
provide an immediate benefit to the public in their available form. Rather, further research would be necessary to
confirm their ‘‘real world use’’. 78

Other Jurisdictions
A number of other jurisdictions, including the
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Japan, have
endorsed and implemented the current United States’
approach, according to which an invention must have
specific, substantial and credible utility. 79
It is not clear whether this approach has been
adopted by the European Patent Office (EPO). Although
the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent
Office (EPO Examination Guidelines) 80 do not explicitly
require that an invention disclose a specific, substantial
and credible utility to be considered ‘‘susceptible of
industrial application’’, according to the Examination
Guidelines for Patent Applications relating to Biotechnological Inventions in the UK Patent Office, to date, such
an approach has been followed by the EPO. 81 With
respect to genetic sequences, the EPO Examination
Guidelines provide that:

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

A mere nucleic acid sequence without an indication of a
function is not a patentable invention . . . In cases where a
sequence or partial sequence of a gene is used to produce a
protein or a part of a protein, it is necessary to specify which
protein or part of a protein is produced and what function
this protein or part of a protein performs. Alternatively,
when a nucleotide sequence is not used to produce a protein or part of a protein, the function to be indicated could
be that the sequence exhibits a certain transcription promoter activity [for example]. 82

It does not appear, based on the above passage, that
specific, substantial and credible utility is required for
DNA patents. It is worth noting that the EU Biotechnology Directive requires that ‘‘a patent applicant [must]
disclose the industrial application of a sequence or partial sequence of a gene’’. 83
The situation in Australia is also unclear. According
to the Australian Patents for Biological Inventions fact
sheet, a claimed DNA sequence must have a specific
utility: ‘‘[an applicant] must describe a specific use for the
biological material. . .[and] if the invention relates to a
gene, the specification must disclose a specific use for the
gene such as its use in the diagnosis or treatment of a
specific disease or its use in a specific enzymatic reaction
or industrial process’’. 84 Despite the Australian Law
Reform Commission’s recommendation, in 2004, that
Australia adopt the United States’ approach, to date, it
does not appear that such a standard is being applied by
the Australian patent office. 85

Part III: Utility Requirement in
Canada

C

anada has not yet taken a position as to how it will
address the patentability of ESTs, and in particular
the question of utility. CIPO has been called upon to
develop interpretive guidelines in this respect, but has
not yet done so. 86 An examination of how the utility
requirement has evolved over the last century may provide partial answers.

Utility is an Easy Test to Meet
In Canada, the utility requirement is easily met. In
1981, the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the language of Halsbury’s Laws of England: ‘‘[non-useful]
means ‘that the invention will not work, either in the
sense that it will not operate at all or, more broadly, that
it will not do what the specification promises that it will
do’’. 87 A number of older cases also suggest that the
utility requirement is not onerous. 88 For example, a 1928
Exchequer Court decision found that ‘‘a definite amount
of utility is not required by law to sustain an invention; a
slight amount of utility is sufficient’’. 89 The MOPOP
states that while an invention must have some purpose,
it need not have any particular purpose unless such a
purpose is described in the specification. 90

ESTs under Canadian Patent Law: Useful or Not?
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Interpretation and Application of the
Utility Requirement by Canadian Courts
Utility may be an easy test to meet, but what it
means for an invention to be useful, under current
patent law, is uncertain. Canadian courts have been
inconsistent in their discussions on utility, using such
expressions as ‘‘industrial value’’ and ‘‘commercial
utility’’ without defining them. Because ESTs are often
described as mere research tools that have little or no
commercial value, the interpretation of utility will determine whether they satisfy the utility requirement for
patentability. For this reason, it is worth briefly reviewing
some of the cases in which Canadian courts have interpreted and applied the utility requirement.
In Re Application of Abitibi Co. [Abitibi], the applicant sought a patent for a mixed fungal yeast culture
system that could be used to digest effluent from wood
pulp mills. 91 The Patent Appeal Board and Commissioner of Patents, in considering whether the patentability requirements were met, stated that an invention
could not be ‘‘a mere laboratory curiosity whose only
possible claim to utility is as starting material for further
research’’. 92 The Board seems to have adopted the
Brenner v. Manson standard according to which mere
research tools are unpatentable. The MOPOP was subsequently amended to prohibit claims to mere research
tools, requiring that inventions have industrial value. 93
No other Canadian case has considered, whether an
invention useful only as a research tool, meets the utility
requirement under patent legislation.
Although the Abitibi decision has not been overturned, the short passage on utility has been cited only
once by Canadian courts in over 20 years. Justice Binnie,
dissenting in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of
Harvard Mouse, referred to the above passage in the
context of his discussion on patentable subject-matter,
and without commenting on it. 94 The MOPOP has been
amended and no longer prohibits claims on research
tools. 95 On this basis, I would suggest that Canadian
patent law has not adopted the reasoning in Brenner v.
Manson, and that research tools are not unpatentable,
per se, for lack of utility.
In 1928, in the case of Prentice v. Dominion Rubber
Co. [Prentice], the Exchequer Court considered the
validity of a patent claiming an improvement in interlocking fastener construction. It found that
‘‘[c]ommercial utility is the very essence of a patent; a
favourable reception by the purchasing public affords
strong evidence of that degree of utility required by
law’’. 96 The Court found that the commercial adoption
of the invention provided sufficient proof of its utility. 97
In the 1939 decision of Northern Electric Co. v.
Brown’s Theatres Ltd. [Northern Electric], the Exchequer
Court considered the validity of a patent claiming ‘‘an
invention for the control of electric currents by and in
accordance with variations of light’’. 98 It stated that ‘‘[a]n
invention to be patentable must confer on the public a
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benefit. Utility, as predicated of inventions, means industrial value ’’. 99 Applying this test to the case at hand, the
Court found that the invention lacked utility ‘‘because it
[was] inoperable for the purpose for which it was
designed’’. 100 In the Court’s opinion, it was not reasonable to believe that a worker competent in the art,
would, at the date of the specification, use the invention
as described. 101 In fact, the invention in question had
never gone into use. The Court, in this case, appears to
have adopted a fairly low standard for utility.
These two decisions, both by Maclean P. of the
Exchequer Court of Canada, appear inconsistent.
Whereas the Court, in Prentice, found that the utility
requirement for patentability required commercial
utility, in Northern Electric, it interpreted utility as
requiring industrial value. It is unclear whether the
Court applied the same standard while simply using
different terminology, or whether it applied two different standards for assessing utility, and if so, on what
basis.
In Re Application No. 003,389 of N.V. Organon
[Organon], the Patent Appeal Board was called upon to
determine whether a patent claiming a method of pathological diagnosis satisfied the definition of invention
under s. 2(d) of the Patent Act, and more specifically
whether it was a useful art or process. 102 The Board
found that it was, since it was ‘‘inherently beneficial to
the public. . .[and had] utility in practical
affairs. . .[and]commercial applications ’’. 103 Because the
Board did not address the utility requirement specifically, but rather considered whether the invention was a
‘‘useful art or process’’, it is unclear whether its findings
are relevant to the question of utility, or whether they are
relevant to whether an invention is patentable subjectmatter.
In the 1981 Supreme Court of Canada decision of
Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan)
Ltd. [Consolboard], Dickson J., speaking to the validity of
two patents, one for wafers and the other for a
waferboard, adopted Halsbury’s Laws of England
according to which ‘‘ the practical usefulness of the invention does not matter, nor does its commercial utility,
unless the specification promises commercial utility, nor
does it matter whether the invention is of any real benefit to the public, or particularly suitable for the purposes
suggested’’. 104 As the issue in this case was whether the
statutory requirement to fully describe the invention in
the specification had been met, the Court did not apply
the test for utility as explained in Halsbury’s Laws of
England. As such, the binding nature of the Court’s brief
discussion on utility is uncertain. 105
In 1989, in Pioneer Hi Bred Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) [Pioneer], the Supreme Court was
faced with a patent claiming a new soybean variety
developed from cross-breeding. 106 The Court stated that
‘‘all inventions are not necessarily patentable, even if they
are the work of an inventive genius, they produce a new
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industrial result, and are commercially useful. . ..’’ 107 The
Court referred to the patentability requirements to
explain that even if these requirements are met, failure to
comply with the disclosure requirements may render an
invention unpatentable. It did not make any findings as
to whether the utility requirement was met in the case at
hand. It is interesting to note that the Court referred to
the Northern Electric decision as standing for the proposition that the utility requirement will be satisfied
where an invention is ‘‘commercially useful’’. 108 The
Northern Electric decision, however, interprets the
utility requirement as requiring ‘‘ industrial value ’’, and
does not consider commercial utility. 109
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The Patent Appeal Board, in the 1992 decision of
Re McIntyre, considered the validity of a patent claiming
‘‘an apparatus and method for evaluating a patient’s
heart function by monitoring the change in arterial pulsations while the patient performs a heart straining
maneuver’’. 110 The patent application had originally
been denied for lack of industrial or commercial value,
on the basis that because the process claims must be
practiced on the body of individuals, they did not
describe an industrial process and did not result in a
marketable product. 111 The Patent Appeal Board considered whether the invention was useful:
If diagnostic methods are to be patentable then commercial
value cannot be assessed as if they are processes for producing milk feedstock. The test must be that the method,
and its results, has value to the community to which it is
addressed; that the method be reproducible by anyone
skilled in the art; and that some economic benefit can be
realized by those who practice the method. We see no
reason to doubt that the method claimed in this application
will not be useful to the medical community.. . .The method
can be worked on a commercial scale that is adequate and
reasonable under the circumstances, and which will certainly result in some form of economic benefit for the practitioner. 112

Interestingly, while the patent examiner seems to
have considered whether the invention had either commercial or industrial value, 113 the Board simply considered whether it had commercial value. It did, however,
adopt a flexible test for determining whether the utility
requirement is met, according to which an invention
will have commercial value if it ‘‘has value to the community to which it is addressed’’. 114
The Trial Division of the Federal Court, in the 1995
decision of Cochlear Corp. v. Cosem Neurostim Ltée
[Cochlear], assessed the validity of a patent claiming an
‘‘implantable tissue-stimulating prosthesis’’. 115 It defined
utility as requiring that an invention ‘‘be operative and
have some commercial value ’’. 116 After stating that ‘‘[t]he
utility of a patent may be proven by the reception
received from the public’’, the Court found that the
utility requirement was met as the invention had commercial success. 117

General Observations Based on the Cases
Examined Above
Early Exchequer Court decisions in Prentice and
Northern Electric as well as the Patent Appeal Board
decision in Organon emphasized the importance of an
invention being beneficial to the public. 118 The Supreme
Court in Consolboard, however, adopted Halsbury’s
Laws of England according to which ‘‘it does not matter
whether the invention is of any real benefit to the
public’’. 119 Because the Court in that case did not specifically consider whether the utility requirement was met,
but rather considered whether the disclosure of the
invention in the specification was sufficient, it is unclear
whether its discussion on utility is authoritative. The
MOPOP states, based on the Organon decision, that subject-matter ‘‘that does not have results beneficial to the
public’’ will not satisfy the utility requirement under s. 2
of the Patent Act. 120 It is worth noting that CIPO has
integrated into the MOPOP certain aspects of the Halsbury’s Laws of England passage adopted by the Supreme
Court in Consolboard, but not others. 121
Of the cases examined, only Northern Electric interpreted ‘‘useful’’ under the legislation as requiring that an
invention have ‘‘industrial value’’. 122 Other cases do not
explain what it means for an invention to be useful, but
rather, speak of the requirement being met because of
the commercial utility, value or success of the invention.
For example, in Prentice, the Exchequer Court stated
that ‘‘a favourable reception by the purchasing public
affords strong evidence of that degree of utility required
by law’’. 123 The Federal Court in Cochlear similarly
found that ‘‘[t]he utility of a patent may be proven by the
reception received from the public’’ (i.e. its commercial
success). 124 Therefore, an invention which has commercial success will meet the utility requirement under the
law. 125
Whereas commercial utility, value or success may
provide proof of utility, these cases do not state that an
invention must meet such a standard to satisfy the utility
requirement under the law. The MOPOP previously
required industrial value for an invention to be considered useful. 126 This, however, has changed, and the section on utility no longer explicitly requires industrial
value. 127 In fact, it does not require commercial value or
commercial utility either. Rather, it simply states, on the
basis of the decision in Consolboard, that an invention
must be ‘‘useful for some purpose’’. 128 It should be noted,
however, that in its section on subject-matter, the
MOPOP requires an art, process or manner of manufacture to ‘‘produce an essentially economic result in relation to trade, commerce, or industry’’. 129 Not only does
this relate to the issue of whether an invention is patentable subject-matter, and not to the question of utility,
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but it also does not apply to compositions of matter.
Thus, under the MOPOP, there is no general requirement that inventions have either commercial utility or
industrial value.
An examination of the above cases reveals that the
type of utility that is required for inventions to meet the
requirement under the law is somewhat ambiguous.
Canadian courts have not, to date, required that inventions have a specific, substantial and credible utility, as is
required in the United States. Rather, they have used
expressions such as ‘‘commercial utility’’, ‘‘commercial
success’’, ‘‘commercial value’’ and ‘‘industrial value’’,
sometimes interchangeably, and mostly without any
explanation of their meaning. Courts have also referred
to similar expressions in their examination of whether
an invention meets the requirement of inventiveness. 130
The uncertainty surrounding the meaning of utility as
required by the Patent Act makes it difficult to ascertain
how it would be applied to ESTs, and whether such
‘‘inventions’’ will be found to satisfy the requirement.
Utility of ESTs
The patentability of ESTs raises a number of complex issues, one of which is whether such inventions
meet the requirement of utility under patent law. ESTs
have been described as having little or no commercial
value, because ‘‘they do not themselves result in a
‘product’, but rather allow one to continue down the
path to a useful end result. . . . It is the gene itself, in its
full-length or characterized form, that is potentially
useful (in advancing a commercial interest or biological
knowledge)’’. 131 As such, because most ESTs have ‘‘no
genuine therapeutic or diagnostic value’’, their use, as
research tools, is considered intermediate. 132 While providing a means through which commercial products,
such as medicines or vaccines, may be developed, ESTs
are generally not considered such products themselves. 133 ESTs rarely provide specific information
regarding the location and function of the full-length
gene, and a significant amount of work is needed to
isolate the full-length gene and identify its function. 134
Although most ESTs may serve as probes or markers,
their gene or chromosomal target is generally unknown
when patent protection is sought. 135
For the reasons that follow, I would suggest that
ESTs meet the current utility requirement under Canadian patent law.
ESTs are important research tools that have a significant value to the scientific community, largely because
they ‘‘represent a copy of just the interesting part of the
genome, that which is expressed’’. 136 A DNA sequence
can assist in isolating the full-length gene, which can
then be sequenced, characterized and its function identified. Various uses to which the biotechnology industry
can put ESTs include using them as diagnostic probes, to
construct arrays and perform comparative genomics
studies, and for chromosome mapping, tissue typing, and
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forensic identification. 137 The use of ESTs as research
tools accelerates research and development, and saves
important resources in terms of time and cost. They
therefore provide an economic benefit to those who use
them, and are of sufficient value to the scientific community to meet the test set out in Re McIntyre. 138
Utility is meant to be an easy test to meet. 139 As
such, it should be flexible enough to take into account
the fact that not all inventions are intended to produce
marketable products available to the purchasing public.
Certain inventions are meant to be used by a particular
trade or industry, without necessarily becoming objects
of commerce. According to the Supreme Court decision
in Consolboard, all that is required of an invention is
that it ‘‘be useful for some purpose’’. 140 As such, the use
of ESTs as research tools should be sufficient to meet this
low standard. In fact, not only do ESTs ‘‘have the potential to yield commercial products in the future’’, 141 but
they can also be sold as commercial products, even for
their use as research tools. 142 As explained in The Ethics
of Patenting DNA, ‘‘[i]n general, owners of patents on
research tools may reali[z]e commercial value from their
patents either by licensing patents for particular
sequences. . .or by applying the knowledge within the
institution to programmes aimed at discovering drugs, or
other research’’. 143
Therefore, not only are ESTs valuable to the scientific community, and as such can be described as having
industrial utility, but they may also have ‘‘some’’ commercial value. If utility truly is an easy test to meet, and if
this test is to be applied in a way that takes into account
the particular community to which the invention is
addressed, then ESTs are of sufficient scientific value to
meet the utility requirement under the law. The fact that
the full-length gene may be of greater scientific interest
and may have greater commercial value then a partial
sequence should not take away from the utility of ESTs
as research tools. In addition, I would suggest that ESTs
are beneficial to the public. While they may not provide
a marketable product, they provide an indirect benefit
through quicker development and commercialization of
medicines, vaccines and diagnostic tests.
The utility requirement for patentability is an easy
test to meet. Unfortunately, Canadian courts have not
consistently interpreted and applied the requirement.
This makes it difficult to know whether ESTs meet the
requirement under the law. Despite the uncertainty that
surrounds the application of the utility requirement, I
suggested, above, that ESTs useful as research tools meet
the current test because they have value to the scientific
community and are beneficial to the public. As such,
they are useful ‘‘for some purpose’’, as required by the
MOPOP.
The Doctrine of Sound Prediction
In certain circumstances, the utility requirement can
be met even if utility is not demonstrated at the date of
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application. A sound prediction of utility can satisfy the
requirement under the law.
The doctrine of sound prediction was explained by
the Supreme Court of Canada in Apotex Inc. v.
Wellcome Foundation Ltd. 144 In that case, the applicant
had identified a new use for the known drug, AZT. The
Court found that the utility requirement under s. 2 of
the Patent Act could ‘‘either be demonstrated or be a
sound prediction based on the information and expertise then available [at the date of application]’’. 145 After
stating that the doctrine requires more than mere speculation, the Court set out its three components:
(1) a factual basis for the prediction;
(2) a sound line of reasoning from which the
desired result can be inferred from the factual
basis; and
(3) proper disclosure. 146
The Court found that the doctrine was applicable
in that case, as the applicant had ‘‘enough information
about AZT and its activity against HIV in human cells to
make a sound prediction that AZT would be useful in
the treatment and prophylaxis of HIV/AIDS in human
beings’’. 147
The doctrine was first adopted into Canadian Law
in Monsanto Co. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 148 based on the English case of Olin Mathieson
Chemical Corp. v. Biorex Laboratories Ltd. 149 and the
Canadian case of Burton Parsons Chemical Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard (Canada) Ltd. 150 The findings in Monsanto
were subsequently applied by the Federal Court of
Appeal in Ciba-Geigy AG v. Commissioner of Patents,
where the Court was faced with an application for new
amines useful in the treatment of cancer. 151 The applicant had not tested all of the amines before filing his
application. The Court stated that ‘‘[t]he predictability of
a particular result seems to me to be essentially a question of fact, though in some situations it may be a matter
of common knowledge’’. 152 The doctrine was not applicable in that case, the Court finding that what is chemically predictable may not be pharmacologically predictable. 153
The case law on sound prediction suggests that a
factual basis for a prediction can be supplied by tested
compounds, and a sound line of reasoning can be
grounded in the known ‘‘architecture of chemical compounds’’. 154 There will be proper disclosure where a ‘‘full,
clean and exact description of the nature of the invention and the manner in which it can be practiced’’ is
disclosed. 155
The doctrine, as well as its three requirements, have
been incorporated into the MOPOP:
If utility of the subject matter which forms the basis of a
claim is not apparent or the promised utility of the subject
matter is in doubt, then the applicant must have established
utility, at the claim date, either by demonstration (i.e. testing
the invention and conclusively proving utility) or by sound
prediction. 156

The MOPOP also confirms that ‘‘a lucky guess or
mere speculation’’ will not satisfy the requirements
under the doctrine. 157
The doctrine of sound prediction has been applied
in a number of cases to chemical compounds, the
Supreme Court of Canada stating, in Monsanto, that
‘‘[w]e are no longer in the days when the architecture of
chemical compounds [is] a mystery. By means of modern
techniques, chemists are now able to map out in detail
the exact composition of every atom in very complex
molecules. . ..’’ 158 To date, the doctrine has not been
applied to a case where patent protection was sought for
DNA sequences. Nevertheless, given that human genetic
material is treated like chemical compounds for the purposes of patent law, 159 the doctrine should be equally
applicable to such inventions.
An argument could be made that, in certain circumstances, patent protection could be extended beyond the
simple EST sequence to include the full-length gene
sequence or amino acid sequence, even if its exact function and location on the human chromosome are
unknown. There are situations in which it is possible to
make a sound prediction as ‘‘to the identity or function
of a gene from which an EST has been obtained’’. 160
As Resnik explains, ‘‘DNA contains information for
the primary structure [amino acid sequence] of a protein’’. 161 This is particularly true of ESTs, since they contain only coding portions of DNA. ESTs which represent
the beginning portion of a gene (5’ ESTs), indicate the
correct reading frame, from which the amino acid
sequence can be determined.
An EST, which is generally about 400 to 500 nucleotides in length, is sufficiently long to encode an amino
acid domain. 162 A domain is a feature of the three
dimensional shape of a protein, usually described in
terms of its fold. 163 Because the conformation of proteins
determines their role in the human body, and because
different protein domains act in a semi-independent
manner, proteins with similar domains usually have
functions in common. 164 For example, a particular
domain may indicate that the gene product will be a
catalytic enzyme. 165
Thus, the amino acid sequence of the resulting protein can be determined based on the DNA sequence of
an EST. Occasionally, the amino acid sequence will
encode a domain which is typical of a protein having a
certain type of function. On this basis, a sound prediction can be made with respect to the function of the
protein which is partly encoded by the EST. 166 As evidenced from the Japan Patent Office Examination
Guidelines, not all domains reveal a major function of
the protein. 167 For example, an EST which encodes a
glycosylation domain would not justify a claim for the
amino acid sequence, because glycoproteins have a wide
range of functions, even though they may also have certain common functions. 168

✄ REMOVE

Username: Shirley.Spalding

Date: 18-JUL-06

Time: 12:39

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\05_02\bellefeu.dat

Seq: 9

ESTs under Canadian Patent Law: Useful or Not?

When ESTs are sequenced, the practice is to enter
these sequences into an EST database (dbEST). 169 At this
point, one can compare the inputted sequence with
those already in the database, allowing a determination
of whether the ESTs resemble a known gene, gene
family, or category of gene function. 170 I would suggest
that this, too, can be the basis of sound prediction.
For the reasons provided above, I would suggest that
if a sound prediction can be made of the function of the
gene or protein based on the DNA sequence, which
reveals information about structure, the utility requirement could be satisfied. The fact that this function may
have been identified through a homology search in a
computer database is irrelevant to the determination of
whether or not the utility requirement is met. The
MOPOP confirms that sound prediction can be based
on the structure of a molecule. 171
The United States, Japan and the European Union
have acknowledged that the utility requirement can be
met where the function of a gene can be inferred from
the sequence of a DNA fragment through computer
comparisons with other inputted sequences producing
high homology. 172 While it is not quite clear what high
homology consists of, the Japan Patent Office Examination Guidelines indicate that a 20-30% homology would
be insufficient to claim that the DNA fragment for
which a patent is being sought has a function similar or
akin to another known sequence. 173
Given that the Supreme Court in Apotex warned
against confusing sound prediction with speculation, 174
the extent to which the doctrine may be applied to
broaden the scope of patent protection for ESTs, is as of
yet unclear.

Conclusion

T

he patenting of human genetic material, in particular ESTs, has been the subject of debate for a
number of years. Because most ESTs are useful only as
molecular probes or markers for the identification of the
corresponding full-length gene, the debate has largely
focused on whether ESTs meet the utility requirement
for a patent. It is now recognized that ‘‘there is no
straightforward legal reason to deny patent protection to
all ESTs’’. 175 The United States, and a number of other
jurisdictions, have adopted a similar approach, according
to which this requirement will be met where an invention has specific, substantial and credible utility.
A number of applications have been filed with CIPO for
patents on ESTs and other human genetic materials. It is
not clear whether ESTs meet the utility requirement
under Canadian patent law. Court and administrative
body decisions have inconsistently described this
requirement, referring to such expressions as ‘‘commercial utility’’ and ‘‘industrial value’’, without providing an
explanation of their meaning. ESTs, while arguably
having little commercial value, are sufficiently valuable
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to the scientific community, as research tools, to be considered ‘‘useful’’ under the law. The extent, to which the
doctrine of sound prediction could be applied to allow
patents for full-length genes or proteins, where only an
EST sequence is disclosed, remains an open question.
Although Canadian courts and CIPO have not adopted
the United States approach for assessing the utility of an
invention, federal and provincial government reports
have been calling upon CIPO to ‘‘develop interpretive
guidelines for the application of patentability criteria to
genetic innovations, similar to those in the United States
for applying the utility criterion to [human genetic
materials]’’. 176 CIPO is currently updating the chapter of
the MOPOP which deals with the utility requirement for
patentability. This may clarify its position regarding the
patentability of ESTs, and more specifically, may reveal
whether research tools meet this requirement. Regardless
of the position adopted by CIPO, we could expect litigation to arise, calling upon the courts to address the issues
associated with the patentability of ESTs. Given that two
of the leading jurisdictions in patent policy, the United
States and Japan, 177 have clearly adopted a common
approach, Canadian courts may well decide to endorse
this approach as well. Should they decide to do so, only a
limited number of ESTs would meet the utility requirement under Canadian patent law.
An examination of the threshold requirement of
patentable subject- matter and the patentability requirements of novelty and non-obviousness was beyond the
scope of this article, as was a discussion of the moral
concerns associated with DNA patenting and the potential impact on research and innovation from allowing
patents on research tools such as ESTs. 178 The debate
over the patentability of DNA is not limited to the question of utility, and Canadian courts may ultimately
decide the issue on the basis of one of the other requirements.
I would like to conclude by suggesting two reasons
why the utility criterion for patentability has proven so
difficult to apply to human genetic material.
First, there is no consistency in the way in which
courts, patent offices and academics describe the kind of
utility that is required for biotechnological inventions.
Under certain interpretations, a DNA sequence itself
must have a function, apart from that of the full-length
gene. Under others, something must be known about
the full-length gene or protein. For example, the CBAC
Report states that ‘‘to obtain a patent, the inventor must
be able to identify or modify the novel genetic sequence
and specify the product of the sequence and how it
functions in nature’’. 179 Considering that it is possible for
a DNA sequence to have a specific function apart from
that of the full-length gene, why should the inventor be
required to have determined the product of the
sequence before applying for a patent?
Secondly, there is significant confusion with respect
to the appropriate scope of protection when a patent is
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issued for a DNA sequence. It is not clear when knowledge of a DNA sequence should permit patent protection for the full-length gene or protein, and whether a
patent for use as a probe or marker should cover all
other uses. Usually, an inventor is entitled to protection
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over ‘‘every use of which his invention is susceptible,
whether such use is known or unknown to him’’. 180 Not
only can an EST have multiple functions, but so can the
full-length gene. 181

Notes:

✄ REMOVE

Username: Shirley.Spalding

Date: 18-JUL-06

Time: 12:39

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\05_02\bellefeu.dat

Seq: 10

1

Ontario, Ministry of Health and Long Term Care, Genetics, Testing &
Gene Patenting: Charting New Territory in Healthcare (Toronto: Ministry
of Health and Long Term Care, 2002) at 31, online: <http://
www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_report s/geneticsrep02/report_e.pdf> [Genetics, Testing & Gene Patenting]. See also
Canada, Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building
on Values: The Future of Health Care in Canada (Saskatoon: Commission
on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002) at 209, online: Health
Canada <http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/care/romanow/index1.html>
[Building on Values].
2 Daniel J. Kevles & Ari Berkowitz, ‘‘The Gene Patenting Controversy: A
Convergence of Law, Economic Interests, and Ethics’’ (2001) 67 Brook. L.
Rev. 233 at 233.
3 See Timothy Caulfield, E. Richard Gold & Mildred K. Cho, ‘‘Patenting
Human Genetic Material: Refocusing the Debate’’ (2000) 1 Nature
Reviews Genetics 227 at 227; Martin Bobrow & Sandy Thomas, ‘‘Patents
in a Genetic Age’’ (2001) 409 Nature 763 at 763.
4 U.K., Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: a
discussion paper (London: Nuffield Foundation, 2002) at 25, online: Nuffield Council on Bioethics <http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/
pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf> [The Ethics of Patenting DNA].
5 Austl., Commonwealth, Law Reform Commission, Genes and Ingenuity:
Gene Patenting and Human Health (ALRC Report No. 99) (Canberra:
Australian Government Publishing Service, 2004) at c. 6, s. 6.3, online:
Australasian Legal Information Institute <http://beta.austlii.edu.au/au/
other/alrc/publications/reports/ 99/> [Genes and Ingenuity]. See also ibid.
6 See ‘‘Human Genome Project Information: Genetics and Patenting’’,
online: Oak Ridge National Laboratory <http://www.ornl.gov/sci/
techresources/Human_Genome/elsi/patents.shtml> [‘‘Human Genome
Project Information’’]; Lawrence M. Rausch, ‘‘International Patenting of
Human DNA Sequences’’ (August 2002) NSF 02-333 National Science
Foundation InfoBrief 1 at 1ff.
7 Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, ‘‘Intellectual Property Rights in
Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed
Sequence Tags’’ (2000) 85 Iowa L. Rev. 735 at 748.
8 James D. Watson et al., Molecular Biology of the Gene (San Francisco:
Pearson/Benjamin Cummings, 2004) at 656.
9 ‘‘ESTs: Gene Discovery Made Easier’’, online: National Center for Biotechnology Information <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/About/primer/
est.html>.
10 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4. It is difficult to ascertain, through a database search,
exactly how many such applications have been filed, as the terminology
used to describe DNA sequences is not consistent.
11 Litigation has taken place in the United States: See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d
1365 (Cir. 2005). The issue has not yet been before Canadian courts
because CIPO has, to this point, not taken an official position regarding
the patentability of ESTs.
12 Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, ‘‘Reinventing the Double
Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent’’ (2002) 55 Stan. L. Rev. 303 at 364.
13 See ‘‘The Fate of Gene Patents Under the New Utility Guidelines’’ (2001)
Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0008, online: Duke Law <http://www.law.duke.edu
/journals/dltr/articles/2001dltr0008.html> [‘‘The Fate of Gene Patents’’],
where the ambiguities associated with the most recent utility guidelines
are discussed in detail.
14 For a discussion on the various concerns associated with the patentability
of DNA, see, for example: Genetics, Testing & Gene Patenting, supra note
1; The Ethics of Patenting DNA, supra note 4; Genes and Ingenuity,
supra note 5 at c. 3; Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, Patenting of Higher Life Forms and Related Issues (Ottawa: CBAC, 2002),
online: Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee <http://cbaccccb.ca/epic/internet/incbac-cccb.nsf/en/ah00188e.html> [CBAC, 2002
Report]; Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, Human Genetic

Materials: Making Canada’s Intellectual Property Regime Work for the
Health of Canadians (Ottawa: CBAC, 2005), online: Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee <http://cbac-cccb.ca/epic/internet/incbaccccb.nsf/vwapj/CBAC_FINAL-REPORT_English_Oct14-05.pdf/$FILE/
CBAC_FINAL-REPORT_English_Oct14-05.pdf> [CBAC, 2005 Report];
World Health Organization, Genetics, genomics and the patenting of
DNA: Review of potential implications for health in developing countries
(2005), online: World Health Organization <http://www.who.int/
genomics/en/FullReport.pdf> [WHO, Patenting of DNA].
15

Emphasis added. Patent Act, supra, note 10, s. 2.

16

Robert T. Hughes, Patent Legislation and Commentary, 2005/2006 ed.
(Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) at 9.

17

Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Manual of Patent Office Practice, s.
12.02, online: Industry Canada <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/
patents/mopop/mopop_dn ld-e.html> [MOPOP].

18

Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101.

19

Patents Act 1990 (Cth.), s. 18.

20

Emphasis added. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, 5
October 1973, 13 I.L.M. 268, online: European Patent Office <http://
www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ma1.html>.

21

Ibid., art. 57.

22

Emphasis added. Japan, Patent Act, Law No. 121 (1959), cited in Japan
Patent Office, Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility Model in
Japan, Part II, ch. 1, online: Japan Patent Office <http://www.jpo.go.jp/
quick_e/index_tokkyo.htm> [Japan, Examination Guidelines, Chapter 1].

23

Japan, Examination Guidelines, Chapter 1, ibid.

24

The Ethics of Patenting DNA, supra note 4 at 31. See also Oliver Mills,
Biotechnological Inventions: Moral Restraints and Patent Law (Aldershot,
England: Ashgate, 2005) at 4. A footnote in the TRIPS Agreement, infra
note 29, indicates that member states may consider the two expressions
synonymous. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development & International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development,
Resource Book on TRIPS and Development/UNCTAD-ICTSD (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 361 [UNCTAD-ICTSD].

25

See The Ethics of Patenting DNA, ibid., which states that although industrial applicability is broader than utility, the two expressions are
equivalent, as per the English decision in Chiron v. Murex, [1996] F.S.R.
153, [1996] R.P.C. 535 (C.A.).

26

See UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 24.

27

Genetics, Testing & Gene Patenting, supra note 1 at 32.

28

Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45
at para. 167 [Harvard Mouse].

29

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(1994) 25 Int’l Rev. Ind. Prop & C’right L. 209, art. 27(1) [TRIPS Agreement]. See also CBAC, 2005 Report, supra note 14 at 36, n. 95; Donald L.
Zuhn, Jr., ‘‘DNA Patentability: Shutting the Door to the Utility Requirement’’ (2001) 34 J. Marshall L. Rev. 973 at 996.

30

CBAC, 2005 Report, ibid.

31

Ibid. Note; however, that there are substantial differences in terms of how
various member states interpret and apply the patentability requirements.
The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, imposes minimum standards for
the protection of intellectual property. It has been more effective at
reaching procedural harmonization rather than substantive harmonization. The TRIPS Agreement only requires that member states make
available patents (i.e. that people have the right to obtain a patent) irrespective of the technology: ‘‘Availability does not mean, however, that a
patent needs to be granted in all circumstances’’. Also note that the EU
Biotechnology Directive, infra note 83, does not violate the non-discrimination principle because the TRIPS Agreement gives member states flexibility in terms of how they interpret and apply the patentability requirements. It also allows member states, at article 57, to exclude from

83

ESTs under Canadian Patent Law: Useful or Not?
patentability certain inventions in order to protect ordre public. See
UNCTAD-ICTSD, supra note 24 at 362, 370; WHO, Patenting of DNA,
supra note 14 at 16-17.
32

See WHO, Patenting of DNA, ibid. at 16, 36, according to which ‘‘there is
contention as to whether TRIPS requires countries to grant patents on
DNA sequences’’.

33

The Ethics of Patenting DNA, supra note 4 at 31.

34

See, for example: ‘‘Human Genome Project Information’’, supra note 6;
Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 749.

35

Holman & Munzer, ibid. at 758. See also Demaine & Fellmeth, supra
note 12 at 323; Eileen McMahon, ‘‘Nucleic Acid Sequences and Other
Naturally Occurring Products: Are They Patentable in Canada?’’ (1993)
10 C.I.P.R. 11 at 19.

36

37

68

‘‘The Fate of Gene Patents’’, ibid. at para. 12.

Ibid. at para. 13.

71

Ibid. at para. 3. See also Genetics, Testing & Gene Patenting, supra note 1
at 47.

72

Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 12 at 304.

73

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 770ff.

74

Biology Online, s.v. ‘‘chromosome marker’’, online: Biology-Online.org
<http://www.biology-online.org/dictionary/chromosome_marker>.

‘‘Human Genome Project Information’’, supra note 6.

75

In re Fisher, supra note 11.

Karen F. Lech, ‘‘Human Genes Without Functions: Biotechnology Tests
the Patent Utility Standard’’ (1993) 27 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1631 at 1652. See
also Caulfield, Gold & Cho, supra note 3 at 229.

76

Ibid.

77

Ibid.

78

Ibid.

79

See Genes and Ingenuity, supra note 5 at c. 6, s. 6.114; Japan Patent
Office, Examination of Biotech-related Applications at the Japan Patent
Office (2004), online: The National Academies <http://
www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Tamura1_presentation_Be
llagio_proteomics.pdf>.

80

European Patent Office, Guidelines for Examination in the European
Patent Office (2005), Part C, c. IV, s. 4.5, online: European Patent Office
<http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/pdf_2005/
index.html> [EPO, Examination Guidelines]. See also Genes and Ingenuity, ibid.

81

Genes and Ingenuity, ibid; U.K., Patent Office, Examination Guidelines
for Patent Applications relating to Biotechnological Inventions in the UK
Patent Office (2005), online: The UK Patent Office <http://
www.patent.gov.uk/patent/reference/biotechguide/biotech .pdf>.

82

EPO, Examination Guidelines, supra note 80. See also Genes and Ingenuity, ibid. at c. 6, s. 6.113.

83

EC, Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions,
[1998] O.J.L 213/13, art. 5(3) [EU Biotechnology Directive]. See also
Genes and Ingenuity, ibid.

84

IP Australia, Australian Patents for Biological Inventions: Fact Sheet,
online: Australian Government: IP Australia <http://
www.ipaustralia.gov.au/pdfs/patents/specific/biotech.pd f>.

85

Genes and Ingenuity, supra note 5 at c. 6, s. 6.142.

86

CBAC, 2005 Report, supra note 14 at 37. See also Genetics, Testing &
Gene Patenting, supra note 1 at 47; CBAC, 2002 Report, supra note 14 at
21. Note, however, that CIPO is currently updating the chapter of the
MOPOP which deals with the utility requirement. See MOPOP, supra
note 17.

87

Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Saskatchewan) Ltd., [1981] 1
S.C.R. 504 at 525 [Consolboard].

88

McMahon, supra note 35 at 20.

89

Prentice v. Dominion Rubber Co., [1928] Ex. C.R. 196 at 199 [Prentice].
See also Wandscheer et al. v. Sicard Ltd. (1947), [1948] S.C.R. 1.

90

MOPOP, supra note 17, s. 12.03.

91

Re Application of Abitibi Co. (1982), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 81 at 83 (Patent
Appeal Board and Commissioner of Patents) [Abitibi].

Bernard R. Glick & Jack J. Pasternak, Molecular Biotechnology: Principles
and Applications of Recombinant DNA, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: ASM
Press, 1998) at 651. See also The Ethics of Patenting DNA, supra note 4 at
91; Watson et al., supra note 8 at 651.

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 772.

40

Ibid. at 749.

41

CBAC, 2005 Report, supra note 14 at 7.

42

Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 1817). See Zuhn, supra
note 29 at 985-986.

43

Zuhn, ibid.; Mark Christopher Farrell, ‘‘Designer DNA for Humans:
Biotech Patent Law Made Interesting for the Average Lawyer’’ (2000) 35
Gonz. L. Rev. 515 at 526, n. 79.

44

Brenner, Commissioner of Patents v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 at 534-535
(1966) [Brenner v. Manson].

45

Ibid. See Zuhn, supra note 29 at 974, n. 12, 986ff.
Brenner v. Manson, supra note 44 at 535.

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\05_02\bellefeu.dat

39

Zuhn, supra note 29 at 991.

55

Ibid. at 983.

56

Claire O’Brien, ‘‘US decision ‘will not limit gene patents’’’ (1997) 385
Nature 755. See also Meredith Wadman, ‘‘NIH is likely to challenge
genetic ‘probe’ patents’’ (1997) 386 Nature 312.

57

O’Brien, ibid.

Date: 18-JUL-06

Zuhn, supra note 29 at 998. See also ‘‘The Fate of Gene Patents’’, supra
note 13 at para. 9.

Ibid. at para. 14.

54

Username: Shirley.Spalding

67

70

46

✄ REMOVE

§ 2107 (8th ed. 2001, rev. May 2004). See In re Fisher, supra note 11 at
1372. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has expressed concern with the
United States approach, suggesting that the term ‘‘credible’’ has been
interpreted as meaning ‘‘theoretically possible’’. See The Ethics of Patenting DNA, supra note 4 at 31. See also Genes and Ingenuity, ibid. at c.
6, s. 6.115.

69

Time: 12:39

Seq: 11

38

66

47

Ibid. at 536.

48

Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 at 309 (1980).

49

See ‘‘Human Genome Project Information’’, supra note 6; Demaine &
Fellmeth, supra note 12 at 319.

50

‘‘The Fate of Gene Patents’’, supra note 13 at para. 8.

51

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 750; Zuhn, supra note 29 at 978. But
see ibid. according to which over 20,000 gene sequences were claimed.

52

See Zuhn, ibid. at 982.

53

Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36263, 36264 (1995). See
‘‘PTO Examination Guidelines on Utility Requirements’’ (1995) 50 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. 295 at 303.

58

Meredith Wadman, ‘‘Patent office replies to fears over ESTs’’ (1997) 386
Nature 747 at 747.

59

See Genetics, Testing & Gene Patenting, supra note 1 at 48; Martin
Enserink, ‘‘Patent Office May Raise The Bar on Gene Claims’’ (2000) 287
Science 1196 at 1196.

60

Enserink, ibid.

92

61

Ibid. at 91.

The Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 119 F.3d
1559 (Cir. 1997). See Holman & Munzer, supra note 8 at 768-770.

93

McMahon, supra note 35 at 19; MOPOP, supra note 17, s. 12.03.

94

Harvard Mouse, supra note 28 at para. 31.

95

It is not clear exactly when the MOPOP was amended in this fashion.

Genes and Ingenuity, supra note 5 at c. 6, s. 6.110; Genetics, Testing &
Gene Patenting, ibid.

96

Emphasis added. Prentice, supra note 89.

97

64

Ibid.

Genes and Ingenuity, ibid.; Genetics, Testing & Gene Patenting, ibid.

98

65

Genes and Ingenuity, ibid.

Northern Electric Co. v. Brown’s Theatres Ltd. (1939), [1940] Ex. C.R. 36
at 53 [Northern Electric, Exchequer Ct]. This case was affirmed by the

62
63

Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (2001). See Genetics,
Testing & Gene Patenting, supra note 1 at 47.

84

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

Supreme Court of Canada, who did not comment on the validity of the
claims: [1941] S.C.R. 224. See McMahon, supra note 35 at 19.
Emphasis added. Northern Electric, Exchequer Ct, ibid. at 56.

100

Ibid.

101

Ibid. at 57.

102

Re Application No. 003,389 of N.V. Organon (1973), 15 C.P.R. (2d) 253
at 256 [Organon].

103

Ibid. at 258-259.

104

Emphasis added. Consolboard, supra note 87 at 525.

105

The only decision identified, which refers to the Supreme Court of
Canada’s adoption of the Halsbury’s Laws of England passage on utility
in Consolboard, is Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health),
[2005] F.C. 1205 at para. 69 (T.D.).

106

[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1623 at 1626 [Pioneer].

107

Emphasis added. Ibid. at 1636-1637.

108

Ibid.

109

Emphasis added. Northern Electric, Exchequer Ct, supra note 98 at 56.

110

Re McIntyre (sub nom. Re Application for Patent of McIntyre), (1992),
53 C.P.R. (3d) 532 at 533 [McIntyre].

133

The Ethics of Patenting DNA, supra note 4 at 56.

134

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 750.

135

In fact, according to Zuhn, supra note 29 at 982, even their use as probes
and markers is sometimes unclear. See also Genetics, Testing & Gene
Patenting, supra note 2 at 35.

136

‘‘ESTs: Gene Discoveries Made Easier’’, supra note 9.

137

See Kevles & Berkowitz, supra note 2 at 236; Zuhn, supra note 29 at
978-979; McMahon, supra note 35 at 19; John J. Doll, ‘‘The Patenting of
DNA’’ (1998) 280 Science 689 at 689; Stefan Lorkowski & Paul Cullen,
eds., Analysing Gene Expression: a handbook of methods: possibilities
and pitfalls, (Weinheim, N.Y.: Wiley-VCH, 2003) vol. 2 at 770.

138

McIntyre, supra note 110 at 536-537.

139

See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.

111

Ibid. at 534.

140

MOPOP, supra note 17, s. 12.03; Consolboard, supra note 87 at 525.

112

Emphasis added. Ibid. at 536-537.

141

The Ethics of Patenting DNA, supra note 4 at 56.

113

Ibid. at 534.

142

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 760.

114

Ibid. at 536.

143

The Ethics of Patenting DNA, supra note 4 at 57.

115

Cochlear Corp. v. Cosem Neurostim Ltée (1995), 64 C.P.R. (3d) 10 at
13-14 [Cochlear].

144

[2002] 4 S.C.R. 153 [Apotex].

145

116

Emphasis added. Ibid. at 33.

Ibid. at 180.

146

117

Ibid. at 35.

Ibid. at 186-187.

147

118

Prentice, supra note 89 at 199; Northern Electric, Exchequer Ct, supra
note 98 at 56; Organon, supra note 102 at 258.

Ibid. at 180.

148

[1979] 2 S.C.R. 1108 [Monsanto].

119

Consolboard, supra note 87 at 525.

[1970] R.P.C. 157 (Ch.D.).

150

[1976] 1 S.C.R. 555.

151

(1982), 65 CPR (2d) 73, 42 N.R. 587.

152

Ibid. at 77.

153

Ibid.

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\05_02\bellefeu.dat

149

120

126

See McMahon, supra note 35 at 19, 21.

127

MOPOP, supra note 17, s. 12.03.

128

Ibid.

160

Time: 12:39

Seq: 12

99

online: CIPO <http://patents1.ic.gc.ca/details_comdec?
comdec_number=821& -n=0&-p=0&-t=0&-l=E>, according to which:
‘‘usefulness in further processing is implied in the definition of expression ‘intermediate product’, but such usefulness does not necessarily
imply patentability. A further usefulness must be inherent in the intermediary product. . ..’’ This decision has not been cited by Canadian
courts and it is not clear whether it relates to the issue of utility or
subject-matter.

129

Ibid., s. 12.02.01.

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 749.

161

130

For example, ‘‘practical utility’’ and ‘‘commercial success’’ provide evidence of an inventive step, because they indicate that there was a need
for the invention. They are not, however, determinative to the issue of
inventiveness. See Diversified Products Corp. v. Tye-Sil Corp. Ltd. (1991),
35 C.P.R. (3d) 350 at 367 (F.C.A.). See also Samuel Parkes & Co. Ltd. v.
Cocker Bros. Ltd. (1929), 46 R.P.C. 241; R. v. Uhlemann Optical Co.
(1949), [1950] Ex. C.R. 142, aff’d (1951), [1952] 1 S.C.R. 143; R. v. American Optical Co., [1950] Ex. C.R. 344; Emmanuel Simard & Fils (1983)
Inc. v. Raydan Manufacturing Ltd. (2005), 41 C.P.R. (4th) 385 (F.C.T.D.);
Kramer v. Lawn Furniture Inc. (1974), 13 C.P.R. (2d) 231 (F.C.T.D.), aff’d
(1979), 43 C.P.R. (2d) 231 (F.C.T.D); Wright v. Brake Service Ltd., [1926]
S.C.R. 434.

David B. Resnik, Owning the Genome: A Moral Analysis of DNA Patenting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004) at 19.

162

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 749.

163

Gerald Karp & Peter van de Geer, Cell and Molecular Biology: Concepts
and Experiments, 4th ed. (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley, 2005) at 60.

164

See ibid. at 55, 57, 61.

165

See ibid. at 60.

166

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 749.

167

Japan Patent Office, Examination Guidelines for Patent and Utility
Model in Japan, Part VII, c. 2 at 39, online: Japan Patent Office <http://
www.jpo.go.jp/quick_e/index_tokkyo.htm> [Japan, Examination Guidelines, Chapter 2].

168

Ibid.

MOPOP, supra note 17, s. 12.03.

121

While an invention must be ‘‘useful for some purpose but not any
particular purpose. . .’’, an invention must product results which are
beneficial to the public to meet the utility requirement. See ibid.

Northern Electric, Exchequer Ct, supra note 98 at 56.

154

123

Prentice, supra note 89 at 199.

Apotex, supra note 144 at 186.

155

124

Cochlear, supra note 115 at 33.

Ibid.

156

125

See also Jamb Sets Ltd. v. Carlton (1963), [1964] Ex. C.R. 377 at para. 39
aff’d (1965), 46 C.P.R. 192 (S.C.C.); McPhar Engineering Co. v. Sharpe
Instruments, [1956-1960] Ex. C.R. 467 at para. 53, 35 C.P.R. 105.

MOPOP, supra note 17, s. 12.03.01.

157

Ibid.

158

Monsanto, supra note 148 at 1119.

159

See MOPOP, supra note 17, s. 12.02; Lori B. Andrews, ‘‘Genes and Patent
Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights’’ (2002) 3 Nature
Reviews Genetics 803 at 803.

✄ REMOVE

Username: Shirley.Spalding

Date: 18-JUL-06

122

131

Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 749-750. See also The Ethics of
Patenting DNA, supra note 4 at 47; Zuhn, supra note 29 at 178.

132

Bobrow & Thomas, supra note 3 at 763; Holman & Munzer, ibid. at
749. Note that s. 12.05 of the MOPOP lists examples of subject-matter
that lack utility, or that are not recognized as statutory subject-matter:
MOPOP, supra note 17. One such example is an ‘‘intermediate transitory product with no inherent commercial use per se’’. This is based on
the Commissioner of Patents decision in Re Application 298,822 to
Babcock & Wilcox Company (1981) (now patent 1,116,380) C.D. No.
821,

169

Glick & Pasternak, supra note 36 at 535.

170

Ibid. at 535, 537. See also Lorkowski & Cullen, supra note 137 at 772.

171

MOPOP, supra note 17, s. 12.03.01, which speaks of ‘‘structure-activity
relationship’’.

172

See Japan, Examination Guidelines, Chapter 2, supra note 167 at 39-40.

173

Ibid.

85

ESTs under Canadian Patent Law: Useful or Not?
174

Apotex, supra note 144 at 185-186.
Holman & Munzer, supra note 7 at 765.
176 CBAC, 2005 Report, supra note 14 at 37. See also Genetics, Testing &
Gene Patenting, supra note 1 at 47; CBAC, 2002 Report, supra note 14.
177 WHO, Patenting of DNA, supra note 14 at 15.
178 For a discussion on the patenting of research tools, see Rebecca Eisenberg, ‘‘Patenting Research Tools and the Law’’ in Intellectual Property
Rights and Research Tools in Molecular Biology (Washington, D.C.:
National Academic Press, 1997) at c. 2, online: <http://stills.nap.edu/
html/property/2.html#2>. For a discussion on the potential impact of
DNA patenting on research and innovation, see, for example: The Ethics

of Patenting DNA, supra note 4; WHO, Patenting of DNA, supra note
14; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research’’ (1998) 280 Science
698, online: Science, AAAS <http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/
full/280/5364/698>; Donald J. Willison & Stuart M. MacLeod, ‘‘Patenting of genetic material: Are the benefits to society being realized’’
(2002) 167 Can. Med. Assoc. J. 259, online: CMAJ <http://www.cmaj.ca/
cgi/reprint/167/3/259>.

✄ REMOVE

Username: Shirley.Spalding

Date: 18-JUL-06

Time: 12:39

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\05_02\bellefeu.dat

Seq: 13

175

179

CBAC, 2005 Report, supra note 14 at 7.

180

Zuhn, supra note 29 at 992.

181

Farrell, supra note 43 at 528.

